These approaches bear the risk of introducing mutations selected

These approaches bear the risk of introducing mutations selected via plaque purification

steps. To minimize this type of mutations we chose to generate a reverse genetics system using a different approach, independent of preformed viral RNA components and animal sources. The feasibility of generating such systems by chemical synthesis of DNA was proven previously, for instance, by the generation of poliovirus [29], bacteriophage ϕX174 [30] or H1N1 Spanish influenza virus [31], and SARS-like coronavirus [32]. On the basis of these studies, we report for the first time see more the generation of an 11,000 nucleotide long synthetic genome of a member of the family Flaviviridae. Sequence data from GenBank referring to lineage I West Nile Virus strain NY99 were used as template for in silico design of the cloning strategy. RNA viruses Lapatinib purchase replicate their genome with an error prone mechanism (for reviews see [33]), resulting in a multitude of distinct but related nucleic acids forming a quasispecies [34]. Sequencing of a virus genome (usually cloned by plaque purifications prior to sequence analysis) consisting of millions

of molecules, results in a ‘consensus’ sequence, representing the majority genotype having defined biological properties. Biological properties may change, for instance, when pressure imposed by the host selects for changes of the genomic sequence, visible as a new ‘consensus sequence’ in the sequence analysis. In

all of the cloning and propagation steps no mutations changing the wild-type consensus sequence were introduced by PCR using synthetic templates of verified nucleotide sequence proving the accuracy of this approach. Thus the synthetic progeny virus was biologically indistinguishable from its natural parent. Experimental inactivated vaccines derived from WNVwt and WNVsyn were highly immunogenic in animals. Both vaccine preparations induced comparable levels of neutralizing antibodies and led to similar protection results. Only in the low dosing groups of the protection study differences were observed Carnitine palmitoyltransferase II that can be explained by the experimental conditions and the inherent inaccuracies of the biological system rather than by genetic differences in the two viruses. In addition, both virus stocks were indistinguishable concerning their virulence in mice. Progress in synthetic biology raises biosecurity concerns. The possibility to synthesize pathogens without need for natural sources, for instance the viruses on the Select Agents List [35], results in the expansion of the potential availability of select agents (defined as biological agents and toxins regulated by the US Select Agent Rules that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health). The US government has developed guidance that addresses this issue [36].

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